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Abstract 
The Taliban’s attitude towards the Afghan Presidential elections of 2014 differed in a 
very substantial way from their attitude towards previous elections. Already during 
2013 there were discussions within the Taliban, about whether it would not be 
opportune to support a candidate, in order to get a president elected, who would be 
more amenable to reconciliation talks with the Taliban. However the Taliban were 
unable to reach a consensus on the matter, leading to differing responses to the 
electoral campaign of 2014, with some Taliban networks violently opposed to it, 
while others decided to support specific candidates. During the second round, the 
large majority of the Taliban decided to support Ashraf Ghani’s election, but not 
without serious friction with the movement’s hardliners. The majority of the 
Taliban’s leaders hoped that once elected Ghani would start negotiations with them 
on favourable terms, whereas they believed that an Abdullah presidency would 
make any negotiated settlement impossible in the future. The new approach 
seriously alienated the Taliban’s hardliners, laying the ground for a new wave of 
recriminations among the Taliban, contributing to further internal divisions. 
 
 
Biography: Dr. Antonio Giustozzi is Visiting Professor at King’s College London. He is 
the author of several articles and papers on Afghanistan, as well as of four books, 
including Koran, Kalashnikov and laptop: the Neo-Taliban insurgency, 2002-7 
(Columbia University Press). He also edited a volume on the Taliban, Decoding the 
New Taliban (Columbia University Press, 2009), featuring contributions by specialists 
from different backgrounds. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The attitude of the Taliban towards the 2014 was important for multiple reasons. It 
might have made the elections difficult to carry out, or it might have influenced the 
outcome in favour of one or the other candidate. Ex post, the Taliban’s attitude 
towards those elections turned out to be important for another reason as well, that 
is the prospects for reconciliation in Afghanistan. For the first time the Taliban 
started discussing of elections in Afghanistan as if it was something potentially 
permissible. As we shall see, this was a major development as far as the Taliban’s 
‘political philosophy’ was concerned. An additional reason for looking at the Taliban 
in relation to the 2014 presidential elections is as a test of the Taliban’s ability to 
formulate policy and implement it. The fact that the Taliban appear to have 
attributed quite a considerable significance to the elections makes the ‘test’ all the 
more valuable. If the Taliban are an organisation able to formulate policy and 
implement it effectively, they should have been able to display coherent behaviour 
during the 2014 electoral campaign. 
 
This article specifically looks at the formulation of the Taliban’s policy towards the 
2014 presidential elections and its implementation. That insurgent movements 
might formulate policies towards elections other than mere sabotage is not 
something new, even if the topic is poorly studied. Although the Pakistani TTP, 
ideologically close to the Afghan Taliban, has never gone beyond trying to disrupt 
elections,1 a wide variety of other groups and organisations have done so in many 
different contexts. We know for example that the Colombian FARC tried to influence 
the 2000 local and provincial elections, not so much in order to get sympathetic 
individuals elected, but with the apparent aim of advertising the group’s 
commitment to an alternative type of democracy, cleansed of the influence of the 
old parties.2 We also know that in India, the Naxalites favoured specific candidates 
whom they believed would then facilitate the operations of the insurgents in the 
area.3 Were the Taliban able to develop a coherent policy, and to implement it 
effectively and cohesively? The answer to this question has implications for the 
understanding of the Taliban as an organisation, which go beyond the electoral 
campaign itself.  
 
The article draws from material gathered during two projects carried out by the 
author for USIP (United States Institute for Peace, Washington) in 2013-14.4 A total 
of 68 national level leaders and cadres and Taliban provincial and district cadres (a 
mix of military commissioners, members of the Taliban’s election commission, 
network representatives) and group commanders, 14 Taliban fighters and 50 
community elders were interviewed face to face mostly by the Afghan research team 
and in seven cases by the author himself between in spring 2013 and spring 2014. 
The interviews were distributed across Afghanistan, although mostly in the south, 
east and Kabul’s region, that is areas of greater Taliban activity. In order to cross 
check what Taliban interviewees were answering, the strategy adopted for this study 
                                                             
1 Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics, Harvard University 
Press, 2014, pp. 373-4 
2 Fernando Giraldo García et al, Colombia, elecciones 2000, Bogotá : Centro Editorial Javeriano, 2001, 
pp. 29-30. The FARC deployed similar policies repeatedly in the past, at least according to hostile 
accounts based on intelligence reports such as Luis Alberto Villamarín Pulido, La selva roja, Ediciones 
LAVP, Bogotá, 1997  
3 P. V. Ramana, The Naxal Challenge: Causes, Linkages, and Policy Options, Pearson Education India, 
2008, pp. 73-76. 
4 This article is based on the two reports which were published as a result of that effort: ‘The Taliban 
and the 2014 elections in Afghanistan’, Washington : USIP, 2014 and ‘Violence, the Taliban and 
Afghanistan’s 2014 elections’, Washington ; USIP, 2015. 
has been to interview all of the Taliban separately, contact them through different 
channels and ensure a balance between different Taliban networks among the 
interviewees. This methodology cannot, however, guarantee that what is described 
in this report is representative of all the different components of the Taliban in a 
completely balanced way, given the difficulty of fully triangulating and confirming 
information.5 
 
This article includes a short background section to illustrate the way the Taliban are 
organised internally, as understanding this is necessary for following their complex 
internal debates. Three main sections follow, with the first one being dedicated to 
illustrating the Taliban’s internal debates over the elections, the second one looking 
at the way the Taliban implemented their decisions and the third one discussing the 
long-term implications of the Taliban’s experience with the 2014 elections. 
 
Background: The Taliban’s aims and organisation 
 
The Taliban initially re-organised as an insurgency in 2002-3, but have known 
dramatic organizational changes from then onwards. The re-emergence of the 
Taliban as an insurgency was mainly due to harassment by the new elites in power.6 
In this context the introduction of an electoral system designed in principle 
according to western standards was in the Taliban’s eyes just one aspect of western 
dominance. In practice the Taliban mobilized two main types of constituencies: 
marginalized communities inside Afghanistan (usually referred to as the ‘local 
Taliban’ in the Afghan villagers’ jargon) and madrasa recruits who are deployed from 
Pakistani territory in mobile units during the fighting season (and are usually 
referred to as the out-of-area Taliban). 
 
Almost formally the Taliban have until very recently asserted that their aim was 
overthrowing an illegitimate regime and re-establish the Emirate of 1996-2001, in 
practice it is clear that the Taliban have been thinking about a political settlement of 
the conflict for years. The internal debates over reconciliation with Kabul have 
become more and more intense in recent years, contributing decisively to internal 
tussles especially within the Quetta Shura. Even the recent struggle over the 
succession to Mullah Omar was in part prompted by different views about 
reconciliation and saw critics of the reconciliation process ally with hardliners against 
                                                             
5 The researchers were all experienced Afghan journalists involved in previous research projects who 
understand the local context, and therefore were in a position to use the contacts already developed 
to reach potential interviewees within the Taliban. Existing contacts were also used as introductions 
to new contacts to lay the ground for more comprehensive interviews. The interviewees had to be 
kept anonymous for their own security and the security of the interviewers. The questionnaires used 
were structured, but follow-up questions were allowed and encouraged.  
6 Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn. An enemy we created: The Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda 
Merger in Afghanistan. London: Hurst & Co (Publishers) Ltd., 2011; T. Farrell and A. Giustozzi, ‘The 
Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004-2012’, International Affairs, July 2013; Carter, 
Malkasian, War comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier. London: Hurst, 
2013; M Martin, An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, London : Hurst, 2014. 
the pragmatists led by Akhtar Mohammad Mansur.7 
 
The disparate groups of insurgents gradually came together, initially under two 
command and logistics centres: the so-called Quetta Shura and Miran Shah Shura. 
From 2005 onwards a third command and logistics centre developed in the east and 
became known as the Peshawar Shura. As more funding gradually became available, 
the Taliban also developed a wide array of commissions and offices in Pakistan, 
which managed everything from recruitment, to finance, to governance activities. 
These offices were staffed by cadres selected for their past experience and skills, 
becoming a kind of shadow government. The military organization of the Taliban 
also became increasingly sophisticated, with various attempts to improve their 
command system and internal discipline among else.8  
 
There were therefore three Taliban centres of power as of late 2013 and early 2014: 
 
▪ The Quetta shura is the original home of the post-2001 Taliban and still clams a 
leadership role, though less and less accepted by the other Taliban shuras; its 
men operate in southern, western, and some parts of northern, central, and 
southeastern Afghanistan. 
▪ The Miran Shah shura (also known as Haqqani network) declared its autonomy 
from Quetta around 2008 and operates mainly in southeastern Afghanistan and 
in parts of the central region. 
▪ The Peshawar shura declared its autonomy from Quetta in 2009, is mostly 
composed of new Taliban (individuals who were not Taliban before 2001), and 
operates in eastern, central, northeastern, and parts of northern Afghanistan.9 
 
In the absence of an accepted overall Taliban leadership, the current structure of the 
Taliban could be described loosely federative. Quetta does not officially accept its 
loss of leadership, but can do little about the situation and implicitly accepts that it 
can only coordinate with the other shuras. This ‘federal’ aspect of the Taliban has to 
be kept in mind in that as it will be discussed below the Taliban’s attitude toward the 
elections varied greatly from shura to shura. In addition, these three shuras were not 
necessarily internally homogenous. Only the Miran Shah Shura was more or less 
unified. In Quetta two main alliances of political and military leaders had been 
jostling for control since 2010 and continued to do so with regard to the elections. In 
Peshawar, a minority of hardliners, known as the Tore Pagri network, broke ranks 
with the Shura and carried out their own ‘campaign’ during the presidential 
                                                             
7 Borhan Osman, ‘The Murree Process: Divisive peace talks further complicated by Mullah Omar’s 
death’, Berlin : AAN, 5 August 2015; Barnett Rubin, ‘What Could Mullah Mohammad Omar’s Death 
Mean for the Taliban Talks?’, The New Yorker, 29 July 2015; A. Giustozzi and Silab Mangal, ‘The 
Taliban in Pieces: The Internal Struggle Behind the Announcement of Mullah Omar's Death’, Foreign 
Affairs Snapshot, 3 August 2015. 
8 See A. Giustozzi, ‘Military adaptation by the Taliban, 2001-2011’, in T. Farrell et al. (eds.), Military 
adaptation in Afghanistan, Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2013, pp. 242-261; T. Farrell and A. 
Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004-2012’, International Affairs, July 
2013. 
9 C. Franco and A., Giustozzi, ‘Revolution in the counter-revolution’, Central Asian Affairs, vol. 3, 2016. 
process.10 
 
The debate about the elections among the Taliban 
 
Before 2014 
 
No elections were held during the Taliban Emirate (1994-2001), nor was there ever 
any real debate on the possibility of holding elections during this time or on the need 
for them. Although a few interviewees put this down to the difficult environment 
(the Taliban was never able to gain full control of the country) the majority indicated 
that there was no need for elections within the Emirate system of governance, built 
as it was around processes of consensual selection of leaders by a small group of 
men who considered themselves to be uniquely competent to act in accordance with 
what the Koran demanded. Others cited the lack of strong electoral traditions in 
Afghanistan, and the deep rural and religious conservatism of the Taliban, as 
structural factors that made elections a non-issue during this time.11  
 
So, when the post-2001 electoral cycle started in 2004, if the elections were of great 
importance to the international community, the Taliban’s interest in them was 
largely a negative reflection of this foreign importance.  Because Washington and 
other western capitals had identified elections as important benchmarks of progress 
and success in Afghanistan, the Taliban saw them as necessary and convenient 
targets: very visible and vulnerable, but soft at the same time. Even when the 
Taliban lacked the operational capacity to significantly disrupt the elections 
(particularly during the 2004 Presidential and 2005 Parliamentary elections) they 
regularly issued hostile statements to the press and threatened candidates and 
voters alike with death for the act of participating. Interviews with elders suggest 
that the Taliban lacked coercive capacity at this point, and thus propaganda and 
intimidation rather than direct violence were deployed.12 By 2009/10, the Taliban 
were on the whole better funded and organized and were able to openly attack 
polling sites, candidate, voters, and elections officials, although still unable to 
achieve the desired level of disruption nationwide. A high level Taliban source in the 
Peshawar Shura claimed that in 2009 and 2010 Peshawar was mostly in favour of 
allowing the elections to take place, with the exception of a key hardline military 
leader, Dost Mohammed, who insisted he would in any case carry out a campaign 
against the elections in Kunar and Nuristan. In reality outside Kunar and Nuristan 
(Dost Mohammed’s strongholds), the Peshawar Shura’s military position was rather 
weak, and a full-fledged campaign against the elections would have exposed this 
weakness. Hence the Peshawar Shura mostly limited itself to perfunctory violence 
(such as stand-off attacks), in order to intimidate voters. As UNAMA commented, 
‘the vast majority of incidents were of relatively low intensity and apparently did not 
                                                             
10 This picture of the Taliban’s internal alignments was drawn from the interviews with 68 Taliban 
leaders and cadres in 2013-14. 
11 All the 82 Taliban interviewees were asked about their views concerning elections; see also Longer 
terms consequences below. 
12 50 community elders were interviewed in 2013 and 2014 and asked about previous experiences of 
Taliban behaviour during the various electoral campaigns. 
intend to cause deaths.’ In total, according to UNAMA, 382 insurgent attacks took 
place (Table 1), resulting in 11 officials of the Electoral Commission, 20 other 
civilians, 18 policemen and eight soldiers were killed on election day, a total of 57 
killed.13 This corresponds to a ratio of 6.7 attacks per fatality, compared to a ratio of 
2.5 attack per fatality for all of 2014, which confirm an apparent intent to make 
more noise than harm.14 The Quetta Shura, in 2009 at the peak of its influence and 
territorial control in the south, was by contrast unanimously in favour of disrupting 
the elections, even if it might have turned a blind eye when some leaders cut secret 
deals.15 A source in the Quetta Shura claimed that the Taliban leaders authorised 
local Taliban to tolerate the electoral process in some cases in 2010; but this was not 
a Taliban policy and no coherent statements, either publicly or privately to front 
commanders and shadow governors, were made in this regard. Instead it appears to 
have been the result of high level dealings between individual Taliban leaders and 
particular political elites in Afghanistan with family members running for office or 
some other personal/economic stake in the elections taking place.16  
 
Early planning for 2014 
 
As of the spring and early summer of 2013, there were few signs that the Taliban 
were about to change their policy with regard to elections. In an August 2013 Eid 
message, a statement under the name of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar 
attacks the elections not because they are un-Islamic or fraudulent but essentially 
because they are not Afghan enough: ‘Our pious and Mujahid people know that 
selection, de facto, takes place in Washington.’ 17 All Taliban interviewed in spring 
2013 were in principle committed to a violent campaign to prevent or disrupt the 
2014 elections.18 Military leaders in Quetta, Miran Shah and Peshawar were united 
in their rejection of the electoral process. Preparations started to enhance Taliban 
capabilities in disrupting the electoral campaign and orders were issued in this 
regard to Taliban cadres in the field. The military leaders concurred that both peace 
negotiations and peaceful elections were a non-starter so long as ‘foreigners’ were 
in Afghanistan. The line was that a successful electoral process would be seen as an 
American victory, and that elections could be assumed to deliver only what “the 
Americans want.” Those who wanted to negotiate over the elections were dismissed 
as ‘not real Taliban’.19 
 
This uncompromising stance on the elections and on negotiations was driven by self-
confidence. As an individual close to the Peshawar Shura stated that ‘We want to 
                                                             
13 AIHRC-UNAMA Joint Monitoring of Political Rights, Presidential and Provincial Council Elections, 
Third Report, 1 Aug – Oct 21 2009. 
14 This estimate is based on UNDSS violence statistics and estimates of fatalities inflicted by the 
Taliban (UNAMA, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence). 
15 Interview with senior member of the Peshawar Shura, spring 2013. 
16 Interview with senior member of the Quetta Shura, spring 2013. 
17 “Message of Felicitation of Amir-ul-Momineen (May Allah protect him) on the Occasion of Eid-ul-
Fitr. August 5, 2013.” Unofficial translation http://justpaste.it/3bmi (accessed September 5, 2013).  
18 A total of 37 Taliban leaders, cadres and commanders were interviewed in locations spread around 
Afghanistan. 
19 Interviews with 13 cadres and commanders in spring 2013. 
take power by force. We are succeeding in our strategies. Americans and their forces 
are escaping and they are afraid.’20   
 
A cadre from Wardak argued that allowing the elections would make sense if 
political negotiations had been in the cards, but that could only happen after a 
complete withdrawal of foreign troops (then the official Taliban position). But if a 
withdrawal happened, he continued, the Taliban would easily win the war, making 
negotiations redundant.21 The most extreme view was expressed by a cadre in a 
front under the command of Zakir, who said he would oppose peace even if Mullah 
Omar was declaring it, and that he would oppose the elections under the current 
system even if Mullah Omar was a candidate.22  
 
Plans were made to rotate Taliban cadres around as much as possible in the run-up 
to the 2014 election, so that the elders would not be able to influence the local 
Taliban in favour of allowing the elections as the Taliban leaders believed they had 
before.23 Most importantly, according to the Peshawar Shura interviewee, an 
“Electoral Office” of the Peshawar Shura was established in mid-February 2013, with 
branches being rolled out in the provinces and avowedly tasked to coordinate efforts 
to disrupt the elections.24 The presence on the ground of Taliban ‘electoral officers’ 
was confirmed by independent sources.25 The intent of these measure seemed to be 
enforcing a stricter discipline among Taliban commanders. By June 2013 there were 
already some concrete examples of Taliban being punished for unwarranted 
contacts and agreements.26  
 
The Taliban election commissioners said that their instructions involved talking to 
elders and convincing them not to participate in the elections and to burn their 
cards. They mentioned a plan to inject 10,000 additional fighters in 2014, tasked to 
disrupt the elections.27 A Taliban logistician in Ghazni stated that he was ordered to 
stockpile weapons and ammunition for the elections of 2014, with an eye to a major 
Taliban offensive then.28  An elder confirmed that elders were clearly told by the 
Taliban in their areas that the elections would be banned, warning them not to work 
for the IEC or campaign for any candidate.29  
 
Debates within the leadership – ‘Round One’ 
 
                                                             
20 Interview with senior member of the Peshawar Shura, spring 2013. 
21 Interview with Taliban cadre in Nerkh, spring 2013. 
22 Interview with Taliban cadre in Imam Sahib, Kundun, spring 2013; interview with Taliban cadre in 
Nangarhar, spring 2013.   
23 Interview with senior member of the Quetta Shura, spring 2013. 
24 Interview with senior member of the Peshawar Shura, spring 2013; Interview with Taliban cadre in 
Dand-i Ghori, spring 2013. 
25 Interview with elder in Mohammad Agha district, Logar, spring 2013. 
26 Interviews with five cadres of the Peshawar Shura in the provinces, spring 2013. 
27 Interviews with five cadres of the Peshawar Shura in the provinces, spring 2013. 
28 Interview with Taliban commander in Zabul, spring 2013. 
29 Interview with elder in Sayed Abad, Wardak, spring 2013; interview with elder in Ajristan district, 
Ghazni, spring 2013. 
Beneath the surface of unrepentant rejection of the electoral process, however, 
things were already changing, though unbeknownst to the Taliban in the field. A 
Taliban source in Khost (controlled by the Peshawar Shura) mentioned in late 2012 
that a debate was going on within the Peshawar Shura leadership, on whether to 
support a candidate in the 2014 elections.30 At that time a decision had not been 
made, but the information suggests that the Peshawar Shura’s hard-line opposition 
to the elections as of June 2013 had not been the only option discussed within the 
Shura. Some hints that the door was being kept open to alternative policies emerged 
from the 2013 interviews. The procedure adopted for buying and registering voters’ 
cards in 2013, who left the elders in possession of the card, suggests that the Taliban 
were considering other options aside from just destroying cards in order to prevent 
people from voting. The fact that the Taliban election commissioners in the districts 
had a budget to buy voters’ cards from the elders, usually at around $10 each, also 
point in the same direction. One interviewee insisted that his orders were to prevent 
the elections, not to favour any particular candidate, but he admitted that if he were 
ordered to tell the elders to vote for somebody, he would do so.31 Some Taliban 
cadres admitted that if they were directed to allow the elections to take place and 
support a particular candidate, they would follow these orders.32 A cadre in Ghazni 
also expressed his readiness to do whatever his leaders ordered him to.33 
 
Linked to these intra-Taliban discussions over the possibility of allowing the elections 
to happen appears to have been a meeting that representatives of one of the top 
leaders of the Quetta Shura, Akhtar Mohammad Mansur, had with President Karzai 
in Qatar at the end of March 2013, to discuss the elections, as well as peace, national 
unity and how to resolve the existing problems. Karzai according to him stated that 
there must be elections in all the Pashtun areas and that is why he needed the 
support of Mansur’s alliance. Mansur’s alliance considered on this basis that their 
best strategy was to talk to Kabul and reach a political deal. The discussions in Qatar 
were not conclusive according to the source, but reportedly Mansur’s group was 
ready to support a presidential candidate as long as he was a ‘Muslim’ and did not 
have any relationship with western forces.34 
 
By 2014 Taliban cadres were more open than in the previous year about discussing 
the issue of Taliban possible supporting a candidate in 2014. Some Taliban cadres 
were saying in 2014 that the intent, as least as far as the Peshawar shura was 
concerned, was to support Hamid Karzai’s then chief of staff Omar Daudzai, who at 
that time seemed likely to be a candidate and to receive outgoing President Karzai’s 
endorsement. Supported by some of the regional powers as well, Daudzai could then 
have become the “candidate of peace.” The ‘electoral commission’ discussed above 
                                                             
30 Communication with Taliban cadre in Khost, November 2012.  
31 Interview with Taliban cadre in Nerkh, spring 2013. 
32 Interview with Taliban cadre in Sayed Abad, Wardak, spring 2013. 
33 Intrview with Taliban cadre in Logar, spring 2013. 
34 Interview with senior member of the Quetta Shura, spring 2013. 
could have served the purpose of managing the Taliban campaign in such a way as to 
favour Daudzai.35 
 
The failure to establish political negotiations between the Taliban, members of the 
Kabul government, and their respective international sponsors made reaching an 
agreement over the elections impossible. Daudzai, in the end, did not register as a 
candidate and the Taliban started selling back the cards they had bought. 
Nonetheless, discussions among the Taliban over an electoral strategy continued. 
With the political talks stalled before they had even really begun, the appeal of a 
campaign of unmitigated violence was on the rise among the Taliban in early 2014. 
Not only the hard-liners wanted it, even those still inclined toward a negotiated 
solution with Washington or Kabul started feeling that showing the military power of 
the Taliban would provide leverage at the negotiating table.36 As of early March, the 
Taliban were ready for a massive campaign of disruption against the electoral 
process and announced their intention through a bellicose statement released on 
March 10.37 
 
Soon, however, other factors came into play that prevented the Taliban from 
aligning behind an anti-elections military campaign. In particular, a number of 
foreign sponsors of the Taliban started weighing in from mid-March onward and 
exercising pressure on the Taliban to selectively influence the elections in favor of 
specific candidates. According to interviews, the strongest pressure came from the 
Saudi government, which saw Abdullah as too close to Iran for comfort and feared 
that a large-scale campaign against the elections would keep mostly Pashtun voters 
away from the polls and favor Abdullah, whose constituencies were widely 
recognized to be mostly among Tajiks and Hazaras. Promises were also made for 
rewards if the Taliban complied with Saudi demands, including facilitation in future 
negotiations with the new president.38 At the time, the Saudis were observing 
Iranian successes in Syria (where Assad’s regime was regaining ground on the 
battlefield) and in Iraq (where al-Maliki seemed likely to be reconfirmed as prime 
minister after the April parliamentary elections).39  
 
Tribal pressure also weighed on the Taliban. A leader of the Peshawar shura 
admitted that several tribal delegations visited Peshawar to lobby the Taliban to 
allow the elections to happen: Shinwari, Khogyani, Safi, Jabarkhel, Dawlatzai, and 
                                                             
35 Interview with Taliban cadre in Ghazni, May 2014; interview with Taliban cadre in Nangarhar, spring 
2014. Daudzai served has been a close collaborator of President Karzai for several years, serving as his 
chief of staff and minister of interior, as well as ambassador to Iran and Pakistan. He was previously 
linked to Hizb-i Islami and hails from Kabul Province. 
36 Source within the Peshawar Shura, contacted in March 2014. 
37 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Notification of Islamic Emirate Regarding the Upcoming Elections,” 
March 10, 2014, http://shahamat-english.com/index.php/paighamoona/42887-notification-of-
islamic-emirate-regarding-the-upcoming-elections. 
38 22 of the Taliban cadres and leaders interviewed in spring 2014 confirmed this circumstance.  
39 See Simon Henderson, “The Battle for Iraq Is a Saudi War on Iran,” Foreign Policy, June 12, 2014; 
Benedetta Berti and Yoel Guzansky, “The Syrian Crisis and the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry,” FPRI E-notes, 
October 2012; Curtis Ryan, “The New Arab Cold War and the Struggle for Syria,” Merip 262 (Spring 
2012). 
others. Although the leadership of the Peshawar shura claims to have rejected such 
approaches, one of its members admitted that in practice the pressure had an 
impact.40 In Quetta, too, local communities and tribal councils of the Barakzai, 
Ishaqzai, Hotak, Achakzai, Noorzai, Alokozai, Tokhi, Popolzai, and Alizai tribes, as well 
as figures from notable families of southern Afghanistan, such as Sher Mohammed 
Akhundzada and Hamid Karzai, approached the Taliban to allow voting. Most Quetta 
Taliban interviewed for this project insisted that the elders’ lobbying had little 
impact. Some senior field cadres, however, admitted that the pressure of the 
communities was a factor.41 The Miran Shah shura was also approached by tribal 
elders. One senior source in that shura acknowledged that meetings with the tribal 
shuras of the Zazai, Mangal, Sabari, Tani, Mandozai, Ismail Khel, Totakhel, Zadran, 
and Ahmadzai tribes (Loya Paktia) took place, but failed to get the elders to agree 
with the Miran Shah shura, which was the faction within the Taliban most opposed 
to allowing the election to happen. According to Taliban sources, the elders even 
threatened to actively oppose the Taliban if their desire to get the people to vote 
was not met.42 
 
As a result mainly of external pressure and perhaps also of tribal lobbying, the 
divisions within the Taliban, which were just beginning to heal, opened wide again 
just before the first round. Not only were the three top shuras split over which 
approach to adopt, but there were divisions within them, except for the Miran Shah 
Shura, which remained resolutely opposed to the elections. The Miran Shah Shura 
was unified around the Haqqani family and in favor of a military campaign against 
the elections, which included targeting voters. The Haqqanis have so far shown little 
interest in negotiating with anybody, except on matters such as prisoner 
exchanges.43 
 
The Quetta Shura was divided in two main groups, one willing to give way to Saudi 
pressure to facilitate Zalmai Rassul’s campaign, as well as inclined to use the 
electoral process as a bargaining tool to extract concessions from Kabul (the group 
led by Akhtar Mansur), and the other set on waging jihad against the elections as 
had been the Taliban policy previously (the group led by military commander Abdul 
Qayum Zakir). Among field commanders and cadres there was widespread sympathy 
for Ashraf Ghani; one source aligned with Mansur placed the share at 30 percent.44 
 
The Peshawar Shura came under Pakistani pressure to allow the vote in areas where 
Ashraf Ghani was believed to have widespread support. It decided to opt for a mild 
campaign of disruption, trying to avoid violence against voters and not disrupt voter 
turnout too much (such as it would have been the case if polls had been forced to 
shut down), at least in areas expected to support Ashraf Ghani. The real concern of 
                                                             
40 Interview with senior member of the Peshawar Shura, spring 2014. 
41 Interviews with Taliban cadre in Kandahar and Taliban cadre in Quetta Shura, spring 2014. 
42 Interviews with Taliban cadre in Paktia, spring 2014, and with senior member of the Miran Shah 
Shura, spring 2014. 
43 Interviews with senior member of Miran Shah Shura, spring 2014 and with Taliban cadre in Paktia, 
spring 2014. 
44 Interviews with Taliban cadre in Kandahar, spring 2014 and three Taliban cadres in Quetta Shura, 
spring 2014.  
the majority of the Peshawar Shura’s membership, was not to favor Abdullah, whom 
they regarded as fundamentally hostile, as well as Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, who was also 
regarded as hostile. However, a minority of the Peshawar Shura were in favor of a 
full-fledged campaign of violence, in line with the thinking of Zakir and the Haqqanis, 
who were not concerned with a possible Abdullah victory because they believed that 
it would increase support for the Taliban among Pashtuns. They also argued that 
softening the approach against the elections was doing no good to the Taliban, 
allowing their enemies to portray them as militarily weak. The campaign of the 
minority was also supported by Pakistani jihadist organization, present in force 
particularly in Nangarhar, a fact that probably was behind the fact that Nangarhar 
witnessed the single highest number of attacks on election day (Graph 1).45 Table 1 
shows how on balance the Taliban effort in 2014 failed to stand out even in terms of 
number of attacks compared to 2010, although it was still more intense than 2009. 
 
Table 1: extent of violence on election day, 2009-2014, according to different 
sources 
 
 
NATO UNAMA    
Security incidents of election day 
2014 390 382    
Security incidents of election day 
2010 
 
488    
Security incidents of election day 
2009 435 299    
Note: the data was provided by NATO and UNAMA officials to the author in 2014. 
Chart 1: All security incidents by provinces, 5 April 2014, according to the United 
National Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) 
 
                                                             
45 Interviews with senior member of Peshawar Shura, spring 2014; Taliban cadre in Nangarhar, spring 
2014; Taliban cadre in Wardak, spring 2014; Taliban cadre in Ghazni, spring 2014; Taliban commander 
in Wardak, spring 2014. 
 Note: the data was provided by NATO and UNAMA officials to the author in 2014. 
 
 
Debates within the leadership – ‘Round Two’  
 
The Taliban appear to have been surprised by the high support Abdullah received 
during the first round, 45 percent according to the official tally. By mid-April, they 
knew that in the event of a similar pattern in the second round, Abdullah would 
almost certainly win. So did the regional powers, which had been exerting pressure 
on the Taliban even before the second round. Taliban sources indicate that the 
Saudis and the Pakistanis converged on a policy of asking the Taliban to facilitate a 
second round victory for Ghani, by allowing as many Pashtun voters to participate as 
possible.46 Discussions were also held about what measures could be taken to 
restrain the Pakistani jihadist groups from carrying out indiscriminate violence along 
the Pakistan border. Tribal pressure on the Taliban in the east and southeast also 
mounted to allow the vote. However, some Taliban commanders and cadres saw it 
differently and insisted that the Taliban now had to demonstrate their military 
power.47 
 
The Peshawar Shura, whose members often sympathized with Ghani, was inclined to 
strengthen efforts to allow as many Pashtun voters as possible to vote, in the 
expectation that they would now overwhelmingly support Ghani. By contrast, the 
Peshawar Shura planned an even greater effort than during the first round to 
blockade areas expected to support Abdullah, such as the Pashai-populated Dara-i 
Noor in Nangarhar or most of the Tajik-populated northern and northeastern 
Afghanistan. In these areas, even the ban on attacking voters (implemented during 
                                                             
46 Interviews with Taliban cadre in Nangarhar, spring 2014; interview with Taliban cadre in Wardak, 
spring 2014; interview with Taliban cadre in Ghazni, spring 2014; interview with Taliban cadre in 
Badakhshan, spring 2014.  
47 Interview with Taliban commander in Paktia, spring 2014; interview with Taliban cadre in Herat, 
spring 2014. 
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the first round) was revoked.48  
 
On May 19 through May 21, a big meeting of Peshawar Shura leaders and cadres and 
foreign donors to the Taliban was held in Pakistan to negotiate a common policy for 
the second round. The hardliners were now brought in line and forced to support 
the suspension of any hostility that could damage Ghani’s chances during the second 
round, thanks to string donor support for the majority line. The Saudi government 
representative at the meeting reportedly indicated that contacts with Ashraf Ghani 
had taken place and Ghani had agreed to open discussions with the Peshawar Shura 
after his election, as well as to visit Saudi Arabia shortly after taking over the 
presidency.49 The Peshawar Shura moved into the second round unified at least at 
the level of the leadership. Interestingly, mainstream Peshawar Shura Taliban 
described Ghani as someone who was not only uninvolved in the civil war of the 
1990s (true), but also not being close to the United States and not engaged on the 
government side in this conflict (definitely not true). Dostum’s role as vice 
presidential candidate was either ignored or dismissed with the statement that 
Ghani would be able to control him. The hard-liners, by contrast, rejected Ghani as 
an acceptable candidate, highlighting the presence of Dostum on the ticket, Ghani’s 
reputation of being close to Washington as well as his stated readiness to sign the 
BSA, and the fact that Ghani’s wife and children are Christian.50 Overall, it would 
appear that among the Peshawar Shura leadership there was some determination to 
sell Ghani as a viable negotiating partner to the rank-and-file: 
 
it is impossible to negotiate with the president in the presence of foreign 
forces in Afghanistan. If Ashraf Ghani becomes the president, there is a 50 
percent possibility that he will accept our conditions. But if Abdullah reaches 
to presidency there is zero percent chance that we will negotiate with him.51 
 
The Quetta Shura too had its chance of finding a new unity in opposition of the 
electoral process after Zakir was purged and his supporters marginalised, and Zalmay 
Rassul, the favorite candidate of Akhtar Mansur and of the Saudis, was left out of the 
race. Under pressure from the Saudis and the Pakistanis, the Quetta Shura issued 
orders to its field commanders to stay put for the second round as well, despite 
internal debates that seemed to be leaning toward a violent boycott. Sources close 
to Zakir indicate that he and his few remaining allies were committed to renewing 
the campaign against the elections regardless of what foreign sponsors or the rest of 
the Quetta Shura might argue. However, Zakir was reportedly in hiding and 
increasingly isolated.52 
 
The Miran Shah Shura was inclined like Zakir toward sabotaging the second round of 
                                                             
48 Interviews with Taliban cadre in Nangarhar, spring 2014 and Taliban commander in Hessarak, soring 
2014. 
49 Source within the Peshawar Shura, contacted in June 2014. 
50 A total of 10 leaders, cadres and commanders of the Peshwar Shura were interviewed in spring 
2014 and asked about their views of Ashraf Ghani. 
51 Interview with senior member of the Peshawar Shura, spring 2014. 
52 A total of 10 commanders, cadres and leaders of the Quetta Shura were interviewed in spring 2014 
and asked about the second round of elections. 
the elections, potentially harming significantly Ghani’s chances of success.53 
 
Implementation 
 
Each of the Taliban’s components therefore marched into the elections with a 
different plan. Because of the overlap between the areas of operations of the 
different Taliban shuras, however, and because of divisions within the shuras of 
Quetta and Peshawar, implementing these plans coherently proved impossible. The 
majority within the Peshawar Shura wanted to deploy a more targeted violent effort 
against the elections, avoiding the indiscriminate violence of which the Taliban are 
being increasingly accused. High-profile attacks were to be organized in Kabul to 
convey the message that the Taliban were still powerful and able to strike at will, 
lest anyone conclude that the lower level of violence was a result of Taliban 
weakness.54  
 
The other aspect of the plan was to channel votes in a particular direction. Several 
Taliban cadres in the provinces indicated that at the beginning of 2014, with the help 
of sympathetic elders and mullahs, the Taliban surveyed the villages to establish the 
local orientation toward the candidates. Where it was decided to prevent people 
from voting, the orders imparted to the field commanders were to block roads and 
intimidate voters, rather than carry out direct violent attacks on voters. Several 
Taliban sources confirmed that the Peshawar Shura meant to prevent only villages 
supportive of Abdullah from voting. Most Taliban commanders and cadres in the 
areas under the responsibility of the Peshawar Shura confirmed having targeted the 
“bad villages” with their road closures. Elders in Khogyani also confirmed the same 
pattern of Taliban behavior.55  
 
The minority of hard-liners within the Peshawar Shura instead tried to encourage 
field commanders to exceed the orders of the Peshawar Shura leadership. Pakistani 
jihadist groups like the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan), Lashkar-e 
Taiba, and Lashkar-e Jhangvi, which operate in many areas under Peshawar’s 
responsibility and are closely linked to one of the components of the Peshawar 
Shura known as Tor Pagri (Black Turbans), also encouraged and paid Taliban 
commanders to carry out attacks, including against voters, and to blockade villages 
to prevent people from flocking to the polling stations. Several district-level shadow 
electoral officers (five in Nangarhar, five in Faryab, two in Ghazni) and at least one 
provincial officer (Parwan) were removed for failing to comply with the orders of the 
Peshawar Shura leadership. Several individual commanders in various locations 
either admitted or were reported to have disobeyed the orders to allow the 
elections, or vice versa disobeyed orders to carry out attacks when such attacks were 
planned.56  In general the Taliban bungled their message to the voters, by first 
                                                             
53 A total of 4 leaders, cadres and commanders of the Miran Shah Shura were interviewed in spring 
2014. 
54 Interview with Taliban cadre in Nangarhar, spring 2014. 
55 Interviews with 10 Peshawar Shura commanders, cadres and leaders and two Khogyani elders, in 
spring 2014. 
56 Ibid. 
threatening massive violence, and then only partially implementing a decision to 
dramatically downscale their campaign against the elections. The average voter 
failed to get the message that voting for Ghani was not against the wishes of the 
Taliban, and voters still felt intimidated. 
 
As a result, although in general the vote for Ghani was not greatly disrupted, 
violence in the east and around Kabul region was still the highest in all of 
Afghanistan, although specific pockets of villages believed to support Dr. Abdullah 
were disproportionally affected, according to the Taliban and some local elders.57 
In the south, within the Quetta Shura, Zakir and his shrinking alliance tried their best 
to sabotage the electoral effort, but Mansur and his coalition of networks largely 
abstained from violence. Zakir’s determination to go against the will of influential 
external powers, as discussed, eventually cost him his job as head of the national 
Military Commission after the first round of voting in April. A number of his 
supporters among the Taliban’s electoral commissars were sacked (at least four in 
Herat and six in Kandahar). On the whole, at least two-thirds of the Quetta Shura’s 
available military force was not committed to the campaign against the elections.58 
Only the Miran Shah Shura campaigned against the electoral process without 
internal divisions at the leadership level. However, the Shura’s presence on the 
ground in early April was limited because of snow on the mountain passes and of the 
lack of any effort to better equip its fighters for the winter. Moreover, it appears that 
in practice even the Miran Shah Shura rarely tried to challenge the will of the tribal 
leadership to have elections running, despite having formally rejected the approach 
of the tribal elders. One field commander of the Miram Shah Shura indicated that 
despite formal orders to push ahead with the campaign against the electoral 
process, little enthusiasm among the leaders was apparent.59 
 
Moreover, Taliban sources in Paktia suggested that a minority of field commanders 
of the Miran Shah Shura favored Ghani and tried to have as little impact as possible 
on voter turnout.60 
 
The level of Taliban violence during the first round was already below the 
expectations of international observers. Compared to the first round, the 
implementation of Taliban leadership decisions during the second round was more 
coherent and in line with the decision to favour Pashtun voter turnout. The Taliban 
claimed to have carried out 805 attacks against the electoral process. This was a 26 
percent drop on the level of violence claimed during the first round. There were no 
high-profile attacks at all before the second round and no significant attacks against 
electoral workers or candidate’s campaigners.61 Ghani managed to come on top of 
Abdullah in the second round, according to audited results. The Taliban’s posture 
certainly contributed to that result, even if it was not the only factor propelling 
                                                             
57 See A. Giustozzi and S. Mangal, ‘Violence, the Taliban and Afghanistan’s 2014 elections’, 
Washington ; USIP, 2015. 
58 Interviews with 10 Quetta Shura commanders, cadres and leaders and vive elders, spring 2014. 
59 Interviews with one leader one cadre and two commanders of the Miran Shah Shura, spring 2014. 
60 Interview with Taliban commander in Paktia, spring 2014.  
61 See A. Giustozzi and S. Mangal, cit. 
Ghani to the top position.  
 
Longer term consequences of the debates 
 
As discussed above, among the Taliban leaders there were pragmatic reasons for 
considering an approach to the 2014 elections different from the one that Taliban 
had approved until then. In reality during 2012-14 the internal consultation process 
about the elections led to the Taliban starting some serious thinking about elections 
in general. The most important indicator of this process is the decision of the 
leadership of all the three main shuras (Quetta, Peshawar and Miran Shah) to 
request the respective Councils of the Ulema to give a ruling in regards to elections 
from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. The Ulema’s views are not binding for 
the leaders, but do carry substantial weight. Significantly, and presumably in 
accordance with the expectations of the majority of the Taliban’s leaders, the Ulema 
ruled that elections are in principle allowable in Islam.62 
 
These debates were not yet percolating down the ranks: many Taliban interviewees 
continued to object to elections in principle in 2013-14 (‘If elections are good why 
are there no elections in Saudi Arabia?’)63. A typical complaint was about women 
voting.64 
 
But even among the rank-and-file more enlightened views could be heard, arguing 
that elections could allowable if western interference was avoided, fraud stamped 
out, ‘criminals’ being vetted out and money prevented from determining the 
result.65 Even those Taliban not opposed to elections in principle, however, a 
common argument was that women should never be allowed to participate in the 
electoral process.66 A point also raised was that while parliamentary elections might 
be allowable, the position of Amir-ul-Momenin [leader of the faithful, Mullah 
Mohammed Omar], could never be filled through an election.67  The model these 
Taliban seemed to have in mind looked like a limited democracy, Iranian style: 
‘Maybe we would follow the Iranian system of a leader and president […] we would 
have an elected president under control of Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund’.68  
Some of the interviewees seemed to view elections as a possible concession to make 
in the event of peace negotiations, while insisting that in principle in an Islamic 
government elections are not needed.69 
 
By 2015 Taliban views about the electoral process had made evolved further. At the 
(informal) Pugwash-sponsored meeting in Doha, on 2-3 May 2015, attendees from 
the Taliban ‘diplomatic corps’ stated that not only the Taliban in principle accepted 
                                                             
62 Interviews with three ulema from the Ulema councils of the shuras of Quetta, Peshawar and Miran 
Shah, February 2015. 
63 Interview with Taliban cadre in Wardak, spring 2013. 
64 Interviews with 14 Taliban cadres, spring 2013. 
65 Interviews with four Taliban cadres, spring 2013. 
66 Interview with senior member of the Peshawar Shura, spring 2013. 
67 Interview with Taliban commander in Dand-i Ghori, spring 2013.  
68 Interview with Taliban cadre in Sayed Abad, spring 2013.  
69 Interview with senior member of the Quetta Shura, spring 2013. 
the in a future political settlement an electoral system might feature, but also that 
the Taliban no longer opposed the participation of women in the political process, 
with the only exception of female presidential candidates.70 
 
Conclusion 
 
The 2014 elections turned out to be deeply divisive for the Taliban, but also forced 
them to confront issues that will be essential to any future peace settlement, and 
that they had always been reluctant to thoroughly discuss internally. Hardliners 
within the Taliban were often incensed by what they considered their leaders 
compromising on principles. Some Taliban commanders reportedly resigned because 
of the perception that their leadership was going soft. Overall, the elections caused 
an unprecedented degree of polarization between hard-liners and pragmatists.  
 
Initially the internal debate over the elections seemed to weaken the hardliners, or 
at least to exposed their weakness on this issue. Even Taliban hard-liners admitted 
that opposition to the elections in principle was not as widespread among the 
Taliban as it had been in 2009. A commander in Achin observed that  
 
‘in the 2009 and 2010 elections, 90 percent of the Taliban were against 
election and 10 percent were not against, but this year 70 percent Taliban are 
not against elections and 30 percent are against election. We can say there is 
big difference compared to the past.’71  
 
The desire to maintain good relations with the elders might be one of the key 
reasons why hardliners remained isolated. Indeed, some elders indicated how their 
relations with the Taliban improved during the electoral campaign and how they 
started cooperating with them. By supporting Ghani in communities that were 
already largely pro-Ghani, or at least whose elders were, the Taliban made new 
friends or consolidated relations in a way that may have important political 
implications for the future.72  
 
However, many Taliban cadres and leaders who did not oppose reconciliation per se 
started wondering whether their pragmatist allies were going too far in the 
unprincipled approach, based on the divisions of the spoils at the expense of any 
assertion of Taliban ideology and views. The back door dealing over the elections 
embodied this approach. The handling of pre-talks by pragmatic leaders such as 
Mansur in late 2014 and the first half of 2015 strengthened these feelings, until the 
conflict came out into the open with the struggle to succeed Mullah Omar. 
 
The 2014 elections also highlighted how in the absence of a unified leadership above 
the level of the three main shuras, the Taliban did not have the ability to take 
decisions quickly and in a coordinated fashion. Although they had seemed to 
converge toward a common choice of aggressively disrupting the electoral process 
                                                             
70 Personal communication with western diplomat in Kabul, May 2015. 
71 Taliban commander in Achin, interviewed in April 2014. 
72 Interviews with 13 elders in areas under the control of the Peshawar Shura, spring 2014. 
until just after March 10, when their bellicose statement was released, the new 
situation created by external pressure on them led to a relatively rapid shift in their 
electoral “campaign”. This damaged their image not only because it highlighted 
differences among them, but also because the failure to follow up on harsh 
statements led many observers to assume that the Taliban were weakening.  
The Taliban rank-and-file were confused by the repeated changes in strategy and felt 
in many cases that the ideological purity of the movement was being sacrificed on 
the altar of political compromise. Still, a majority of Taliban field commanders and 
cadres appears to have been ready to follow the majority of the leadership and 
manipulate the electoral process as opposed to merely sabotage it. The elections 
clearly showed that the Taliban had problems of discipline within their ranks, but at 
the same time they were not a rag-tag group of freelancers with a franchise type 
relationship with distant leaders, sitting in Quetta, Peshawar or Miran Shah. The 
debate over the absentee leadership of Mullah Omar nevertheless was revived at 
this time and intensified already during the summer of 2014.73 
 
The Taliban’s new approach implied a greater capacity than previously 
demonstrated to exercise their coercive power in a discriminate way, even if their 
targeting was not as accurate as they claimed later. There is also other evidence that 
the Taliban were at least aware of the need to target their coercive efforts carefully, 
lest they would suffer from a backlash. The data available on the violence shows that 
it was to an extent better targeted than in the past—comparatively few voters were 
hurt, despite a lot of shooting. Still, it was not carefully targeted to deliver a strong 
or clear message of Taliban intentions and capabilities, which was the purpose of the 
campaign. That some Taliban commanders continued to deliberately murder voters 
prevented the Taliban from making significant gains in terms of image. In sum, 
although the campaign against the elections was not a complete failure, it was quite 
messy, and command and control on the Taliban side failed in many cases. The 
desire to target violence more carefully implies a considerable organizational effort. 
Although the Taliban devoted major resources to this task, , it  was insufficient to 
acquire the full capacity to manage armed men on the ground. The Taliban’s effort 
to manage and manipulate the 2014 electoral campaign is representative therefore 
of the wider Taliban effort to improve its organizational capacity.74 
 
Despite the muddled campaign, the Taliban were, as of May 2014, reasonably 
hopeful that something could be gained from their decision to soften their attitude. 
The relationship with most Pashtun tribal shuras, traditionally not particularly good, 
was improving in that the Taliban in the end delivered what the shuras wanted—a 
boost to Ashraf Ghani’s campaign. That Ghani then opted to sign the Bilateral 
Security Agreement (BSA) in September 2014 came as a major blow to Taliban 
aspirations of starting peace talks immediately. Contacts with Ghani’s camp froze for 
some months, but eventually were resumed in late winter.  
 
Regardless of a diplomatic breakthrough, the Taliban may have entered a path that 
                                                             
73 Contacts with sources in the Quetta and in the Peshawar Shuras, September 2014. 
74 See A. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan & Beyond, Cornell University Press, 2008, for a 
study of the organization of insurgent movements. 
takes them closer to Afghan mainstream politics, which for the most part is not 
derived from liberal and democratic principles, but instead a matter of strongmen, 
manipulation, and corrupt patronage networks (see Byrd; Coburn; Shah and Bose, 
this volume). Even after more than a decade of internationally backed state-building 
efforts, in 2014 the local strongmen were actively involved in rigging the vote and 
intimidating voters for several candidates during the 2014 elections. Seen from this 
perspective, the Taliban’s interference in the election does not appear as extreme. 
The main question as of mid-2015 was whether a leadership moving towards the 
mainstream would be able to carry the bulk of its ranks-and-file behind. 
 
